Report on Chinese Support for Iran and its Contradiction with Sustainable Development Goals

Introduction: A Challenge to Global Peace and Sustainable Development

Recent reports indicate that entities within the People’s Republic of China are supplying materials and intelligence to Iran, a state recognized for its sponsorship of terrorism. This support directly contravenes the principles of global peace and security, which are foundational to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. While Chinese leadership professes a “zero tolerance” policy for terrorism, these actions undermine international efforts to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16): Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. The reported activities represent a significant challenge to the global partnership for sustainable development and the collective pursuit of a secure and prosperous world.

Undermining SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

The reported collaboration between Chinese entities and Iran fundamentally compromises SDG 16, which aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

Violation of SDG Target 16.4: Illicit Arms and Financial Flows

The provision of materials for Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional proxies constitutes a severe breach of SDG Target 16.4, which calls for a significant reduction in illicit financial and arms flows. Specific incidents that undermine this goal include:

• Missile Propellants: In February 2025, two Iranian-flagged ships delivered 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a key missile fuel ingredient, from China to Iran. Further orders for thousands of tons were placed in June 2025.
• Intelligence Support: The U.S. State Department reported in April 2025 that Chinese company Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. provided satellite imagery to Iran-backed Houthi rebels, enabling attacks that destabilize regional security.
• Weapons Proliferation: The U.S. sanctioned Chinese and Iranian companies in May 2025 for their role in missile production for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), citing risks of proliferating weapons of mass destruction.
• Covert Shipments: In June 2025, cargo aircraft departing from China, often used for military transport, reportedly disappeared from radar upon approaching Iranian airspace, suggesting covert military aid.
• Military Analysis: People’s Liberation Army personnel reportedly analyzed the U.S. military’s Operation Midnight Hammer against Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, indicating a strategic alignment that threatens regional stability.

Erosion of SDG Target 16.1: Reducing Violence and Conflict

By supporting the IRGC, which in turn arms militant groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, the reported actions directly contribute to violence and conflict, working against SDG Target 16.1, which aims to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere. This support perpetuates instability in the Middle East and undermines international peace-building efforts.

Negative Impacts on Broader Sustainable Development Goals

The strategic partnership between Beijing and Tehran extends beyond military concerns, negatively impacting several other SDGs through unsustainable economic and infrastructural practices.

SDG 9 & SDG 11: Unsafe Infrastructure and Communities

A March 2025 strategic partnership includes Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure. However, this collaboration lacks the focus on safety and resilience central to SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure). An April 2025 explosion at a port near Bandar Abbas, which killed dozens, including Chinese nationals, and destroyed missile chemicals from China, underscores the poor safety standards. This event is a direct setback for SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), particularly Target 11.5, which seeks to reduce deaths and economic losses caused by disasters.

SDG 8, SDG 14 & SDG 17: Illicit Economies and Counterproductive Partnerships

The partnership is reportedly fueled by incentives that are misaligned with sustainable development, including:

1. Shared animosity toward the West.
2. China’s ambition to be a Middle East power broker.
3. Mutually beneficial trade relations, including illicit activities.
4. Membership in the BRICS geopolitical bloc.

In exchange for investment, Iran will send over 90% of its illegal oil exports to China, often using a clandestine “dark fleet.” This practice fosters an illicit economy, undermining SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth). Furthermore, the use of a “dark fleet” poses significant environmental risks to marine ecosystems, contradicting the aims of SDG 14 (Life Below Water). This alliance represents a counterproductive engagement that subverts the spirit of global cooperation envisioned in SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).

Which SDGs are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article?

• SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

  This is the most relevant SDG as the article’s central theme is the undermining of peace and security. It discusses state-sponsored terrorism, the proliferation of weapons, illicit arms flows, and actions that lead to violence and instability. The article details how Iran, described as the “world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism,” is being supplied with materials and intelligence by Chinese entities, directly contradicting the goal of promoting peaceful and inclusive societies.

• SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals

  The article discusses the “strategic partnership” between China and Iran, their shared membership in BRICS, and mutually beneficial trade relations. However, this partnership is shown to facilitate actions that threaten global peace and security, such as weapons proliferation and support for terrorism. This runs counter to the spirit of SDG 17, which calls for global partnerships that support sustainable development goals, including peace.

What specific targets under those SDGs can be identified based on the article’s content?

• Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.

  The article connects directly to this target by describing events that cause violence and death. This includes Houthi rebel attacks in the Red Sea, an explosion at a port near Bandar Abbas that “killed dozens of people,” and a U.S. military operation against Iranian nuclear installations.

• Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows… and combat all forms of organized crime.

  This target is addressed through multiple examples. The article details illicit arms flows, such as Chinese entities providing Iran with “1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a missile fuel ingredient,” and supporting Houthi missile and UAV production. It also points to illicit financial flows, noting that Iran sends “more than 90% of its illegal oil exports to China, frequently via a clandestine ‘dark fleet’ of tankers.”

• Target 16.a: Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation… to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

  The article highlights a failure to meet this target. Instead of cooperating to combat terrorism, it reports that “Chinese entities supplying Iran with materials and intelligence that can support terrorist acts.” Actions by the U.S., such as sanctioning Chinese and Iranian companies, and the U.N. Secretary-General’s condemnation of terrorism, represent efforts to enforce this target, but the core issue discussed is a partnership that undermines it.

• Target 17.16: Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development…

  The article describes a partnership between China and Iran that actively works against global peace and security. The “strategic partnership” announced in March 2025, which includes bolstering Iran’s military technology, is an example of a bilateral relationship that undermines the broader goals of the international community, particularly SDG 16.

Are there any indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets?

• Indicators for Target 16.1 (Reduce Violence)

  The article provides data points that can serve as indicators of violence. An implied indicator is the number of deaths from conflict-related incidents, with the article specifying that “dozens of people” were killed in a port explosion. Another is the number of violent attacks, such as the Houthi attacks on U.S. interests and the U.S. military’s “Operation Midnight Hammer.”

• Indicators for Target 16.4 (Reduce Illicit Flows)

  Several indicators for illicit flows are mentioned. For arms flows, the article quantifies a shipment of “1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate” and an order for “thousands of additional tons of missile propellants.” For illicit financial flows, it states that “more than 90% of its illegal oil exports” from Iran go to China. The number of entities sanctioned for illicit activities is also an indicator, with the article noting the U.S. sanctioned “Chinese and Iranian companies involved in missile production.”

• Indicators for Target 16.a (International Cooperation)

  The existence of agreements that run counter to global security goals serves as a negative indicator. The article points to the “strategic partnership” announced between Beijing and Tehran in March 2025 as a formal indicator of cooperation that undermines efforts to combat terrorism and weapons proliferation.

SDGs, Targets, and Indicators Analysis

Source: ipdefenseforum.com