Report on Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and its Implications for the Sustainable Development Goals

Executive Summary

Transnational organized crime represents a critical and escalating threat to Latin America, directly undermining progress toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The expansion of criminal networks across the region compromises public safety, erodes democratic governance, and obstructs the achievement of key Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). While militarized state responses, known as mano dura, have gained political traction, they often jeopardize fundamental rights and fail to address the systemic drivers of crime. A sustainable path forward requires a holistic approach centered on strengthening institutions, fostering regional cooperation in line with SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals), and addressing the socioeconomic inequalities that fuel criminality, as targeted by SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).

The Destabilizing Impact of Organized Crime on Sustainable Development

Geographic and Institutional Expansion of Criminal Networks

Transnational organized crime has evolved into a sophisticated, multinational enterprise that extends beyond traditional hubs like Mexico and Colombia. The criminal landscape has been reshaped by the expansion of these networks into nations such as Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. This expansion is not merely geographical but institutional, as criminal groups systematically infiltrate state structures.

• Ecuador: Has become a pivotal transit hub for cocaine, with local gangs collaborating with international cartels.
• Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay: Have seen a surge in narco-trafficking and arms smuggling, facilitated by weak border enforcement.
• Argentina and Chile: Face rising violence and the establishment of foreign criminal groups, particularly in port cities.

Erosion of SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

The infiltration of criminal networks into governments, police forces, and judicial systems creates a state of “criminal governance,” which directly contravenes the core tenets of SDG 16. This phenomenon fundamentally weakens the state’s ability to function effectively and undermines public trust.

• Violation of SDG 16.1: Homicide rates in the region are among the highest globally, with Latin America accounting for nearly one-third of the world’s homicides despite having only 8% of the population.
• Violation of SDG 16.4: The proliferation of illicit financial and arms flows fuels instability and violence.
• Violation of SDG 16.5: Systemic corruption and bribery by criminal syndicates cripple state institutions.
• Violation of SDG 16.6: The development of effective, accountable, and transparent institutions is severely hampered, leading to widespread impunity.

State Responses: The Mano Dura Approach and its Conflict with SDG Principles

The Rise of Militarized Security Policies

In response to public demand for security, many Latin American leaders have adopted mano dura (iron fist) strategies. These policies prioritize repression, mass arrests, and the deployment of military forces for domestic law enforcement. President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador is the primary proponent of this model, which has been emulated or considered by leaders in Ecuador and Argentina.

Short-Term Gains vs. Long-Term Institutional Damage

While such policies can deliver short-term reductions in violence and are often popular with voters, they pose a grave threat to long-term democratic stability and human rights, undermining the foundational principles of SDG 16.

• Erosion of Civil Liberties: Measures like states of emergency, mass incarceration without due process, and expanded surveillance conflict with SDG 16.3 (Promote the rule of law).
• Human Rights Abuses: In Ecuador, a militarized crackdown has coincided with a rise in forced disappearances and reports of human rights violations, even as homicide rates have slightly decreased.
• Limited Efficacy: Research indicates that mano dura policies often have little to no lasting effect on crime rates and can exacerbate violence by failing to dismantle the complex political and financial structures of organized crime.

Pathways to Sustainable Security: Justice, Cooperation, and Socioeconomic Development

Strengthening Institutions to Uphold SDG 16

The most effective long-term strategy against organized crime involves reinforcing the independence and capacity of the justice system, a core objective of SDG 16. When prosecutors, judges, and police are empowered to act independently, they can dismantle the networks of corruption that protect criminals.

1. Guatemala: The UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) successfully exposed high-level corruption linked to narco-trafficking, demonstrating the power of independent oversight.
2. Argentina: In Rosario, independent prosecutors convicted police and politicians colluding with drug gangs, showing the efficacy of a robust judicial process.
3. Ecuador: Attorney General Diana Salazar’s “Metastasis” investigation has exposed deep collusion between criminal organizations and state officials, highlighting the critical role of independent prosecutors in advancing SDG 16.5.

The Role of Regional Partnerships (SDG 17) and Alternative Strategies

Given the transnational nature of the threat, isolated national efforts are insufficient. Coordinated regional strategies are essential, reflecting the spirit of SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).

• Regional Alliances: Initiatives like the Merida Initiative, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the new Alliance for Security, Justice and Development (uniting 18 regional governments) aim to enhance information sharing, combat money laundering, and strengthen justice systems collectively.
• Addressing Root Causes (SDGs 8 & 10): Alternative strategies focus on the socioeconomic drivers of crime. Intelligence-led policing, community-based prevention programs, and social investment in marginalized areas—as seen in Medellin, Colombia—aim to create economic opportunities and reduce inequality, aligning with SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). These approaches offer a more sustainable, rights-respecting path to security.

Future Scenarios for Security and Sustainable Development in Latin America

Most Likely Scenario: Stagnation on SDG 16

Mano dura policies will likely remain politically popular, but their inability to dismantle entrenched criminal-political networks means they will fail to produce sustainable reductions in violence. This will result in continued high levels of corruption and violence, impeding progress on SDG 16. Public support for these measures may wane if security does not demonstrably improve.

Likely Scenario: Regional Decline in Security

A combination of persistent poverty and inequality (undermining SDGs 8 and 10), the transnational capacity of criminal networks, and a lack of cohesive regional cooperation (a failure of SDG 17) could lead to a further deterioration of security across the region. Criminal groups will continue to exploit jurisdictions with weak governance, making the achievement of SDG 16 increasingly difficult.

Least Likely Scenario: Coordinated Regional Improvement

An optimistic but unlikely scenario involves a paradigm shift toward coordinated regional action. This would require a unified commitment to strengthening governance, ensuring judicial independence, and implementing socioeconomic programs to address the root causes of crime. Such a holistic approach, fully aligned with SDGs 16, 17, 8, and 10, could manage organized crime effectively and foster sustainable peace, though it would require immense political will that is not currently evident.

Analysis of Sustainable Development Goals in the Article

1. Which SDGs are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article?

The article primarily addresses issues related to SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. It also touches upon themes relevant to SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals, SDG 1: No Poverty, and SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth.

• SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions): This is the most central SDG. The article’s core focus is on transnational organized crime, violence (rising homicide rates), corruption (infiltration of governments, bribery), the weakening of democratic institutions, and the challenges to the rule of law in Latin America. It discusses various justice and security responses, from militarized crackdowns (mano dura) to judicial reform and strengthening police forces.
• SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals): The article repeatedly emphasizes the need for regional and international cooperation to combat transnational crime. It explicitly mentions cross-border task forces, the Merida Initiative, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the “Alliance for Security, Justice and Development,” which unites 18 regional governments and international financial institutions. This directly relates to the goal of strengthening global partnerships.
• SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth): The article implies a connection to these goals by identifying the “underlying drivers of criminality” as “widespread poverty, low investment in education and limited job opportunities.” This suggests that a lack of socioeconomic progress and decent work makes populations more vulnerable to the influence of criminal organizations, thus hampering efforts to reduce poverty and promote sustainable economic growth. The article also notes that violent crime “hamper[s] socioeconomic progress.”

2. What specific targets under those SDGs can be identified based on the article’s content?

Several specific targets can be identified based on the issues discussed in the article:

1. Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.
   • The article extensively discusses “rampant violence,” “rising homicide rates,” “narco violence,” and gang warfare. It provides specific data on homicide rates in Ecuador and notes that the Latin American region accounts for nearly one-third of global homicides.
2. Target 16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.
   • The article mentions that the militarized crackdown in Ecuador has coincided with an “increase in forced disappearances, including of children.” This directly relates to protecting children from violence and exploitation within an internal conflict.
3. Target 16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.
   • The text highlights the need for “judicial reform,” “independent prosecutors, judges and police,” and strengthening “justice systems” to combat crime and corruption effectively. The examples of successful prosecutions in Guatemala (“La Linea” case) and Argentina (Rosario) underscore the importance of this target.
4. Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows… and combat all forms of organized crime.
   • This target is central to the article, which focuses on “transnational organized crime,” “narco-trafficking,” “arms smuggling,” and the need to “combat money laundering.” The expansion of criminal networks across Latin America is the main theme.
5. Target 16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.
   • The article details how criminal syndicates “seize control of the state by bribing or coercing politicians, judges, law enforcement officers and bureaucrats.” It describes the “deep collusion among criminal organizations, judges, police officers, prison officials and politicians” in the “Metastasis” case in Ecuador.
6. Target 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.
   • The article discusses how crime erodes “state legitimacy” and “public trust,” leading to “weak governance.” It contrasts ineffective state responses with the need for “strengthening of institutions” and building “robust institutions” as a sustainable alternative to short-term policies.
7. Target 16.a: Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation… to prevent violence and combat… crime.
   • The article argues that an effective response “requires a coordinated regional strategy.” It cites the “Alliance for Security, Justice and Development” as a key example of international cooperation aimed at strengthening institutions and sharing criminal records to combat crime.
8. Target 1.1 / 8.5: Eradicate extreme poverty / Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all.
   • These are implied through the article’s identification of “widespread poverty” and “limited job opportunities” as root causes that make narco-trafficking and organized crime “more enticing.”

3. Are there any indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets?

Yes, the article mentions and implies several indicators that align with the official SDG indicators:

• Homicide Rate (Indicator 16.1.1): The article provides explicit data points for this indicator. It states, “In 2024, Ecuador’s homicide rate decreased to 38.8 per 100,000 people from 44.5 in 2023.” It also mentions the regional context, noting Latin America “accounts for nearly one-third of global homicides.”
• Public Perception of Safety (Indicator 16.1.4): The article implies this indicator by stating that “security ranks among the top public concerns” in many Latin American countries and that “public frustration with crime and weak governance is particularly intense.” The popularity of mano dura policies is presented as a direct result of public fear and prioritization of immediate safety.
• Reports of Human Rights Abuses and Violence Against Children (Relates to Indicators 16.1.3, 16.2.1, 16.2.3): The article mentions that in Ecuador, “reports of human rights abuses have sharply increased” and that there has been an “increase in forced disappearances, including of children.” These qualitative reports serve as indicators of violence and human rights violations.
• Prevalence of Bribery and Corruption (Indicator 16.5.1 / 16.5.2): While not providing a quantitative rate, the article provides strong qualitative evidence of corruption. The descriptions of criminal networks “bribing or coercing politicians, judges, law enforcement officers” and the detailed accounts of the “La Linea” and “Metastasis” cases serve as evidence of the prevalence of bribery and corruption within public institutions.
• Public Trust in Institutions (Relates to Indicator 16.6.2): The article mentions the “eroding public trust” in government and democratic institutions. The high public support for militarized crackdowns over traditional democratic processes is an implied indicator of low trust in the effectiveness of existing judicial and police institutions.

4. SDGs, Targets, and Indicators Table

Source: gisreportsonline.com