NATO’s New Northern Flank — Don’t Ruin It

While waiting for Finland and Sweden to finalize their NATO accession, the Nordic countries have already started to update regional cooperation agreements and further develop operational integration of their armed forces.

But there’s a problem. Despite years of work between the Nordic nations, NATO is not currently structured to exploit this to the full. The current command structure does not serve the needs of the new Northern Flank, as the Nordics are currently divided into two Joint Force Commands: Finland and Denmark under Brunssum in the Netherlands, and Norway under Norfolk in Virginia.

Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession is nothing short of a revolution for Northern Europe’s security, as the two countries bridge what was a gap in alliance territory between Norway in the Arctic, and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the Baltic Sea.

Sweden is a major connecting link between Finland and Norway in the north, and to continental Europe in the South through Denmark. Uniting all the Nordics in the same alliance unlocks an unprecedented level of strategic cohesion, making it possible to plan regional defense from the Baltic Sea to the North Atlantic and the Arctic.

However, the public information available about NATO’s new regional defense plans suggests that the region will be divided between the European Arctic and the Atlantic on the one hand, and the Baltic and Central Europe on the other. If implemented, it would be bad news for Finland and Sweden. Both countries are essential for their contribution to the defense of the Baltic region, but equally so for the Arctic. Any division of the two into different defense plans would disrupt the close bilateral cooperation and other existing Nordic defense arrangements. It would be a sad reversal of the very considerable strengths of Finland and Sweden if NATO now separates them.

The risk is that good work already underway — some of it dating back decades— will be lost.

In March for example, the air forces of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland signed a letter of intent to develop a Nordic air operations concept, with four focus areas: integrated command and control, operations planning and execution; flexible and resilient joint deployment of the air forces; shared situational awareness and airspace surveillance; and joint training and exercises.

A logical next step would be a similar agreement among the Nordic navies. Finland and Sweden already have a joint operational amphibious unit and exercise together constantly, with both countries’ troops operating under an alternating single command. Since the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea near the Danish island of Bornholm, there is an increasing need to counter Russia’s potential interference with underwater energy infrastructure. The public broadcasters of the Nordic countries recently conducted a joint investigation on the topic, increasing threat awareness across the region. Protection of maritime infrastructure is an area that requires international cooperation — and that comes naturally to the Nordics.

The need for joint action was recognized long ago. In 2009, the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was established in the wake of the global financial crisis as the Nordic countries hoped to profit from joint procurement schemes, although this has been one the least successful parts of the organization. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea transformed Nordic cooperation, inducing swift alignment of threat perceptions. Since then, cooperation has been increasingly focused on intensifying interoperability. In the past 10 years, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have all been subject to frequent Russian intimidation through airspace violations, interference with undersea cables, and even simulated nuclear attacks during exercises.

It is not just the Russian threat that brings the Nordics closer: they have also been united in their strong support for Ukraine after the full-scale invasion in 2022, and each of the countries (except Iceland) has surpassed €1bn ($1.1bn) in military aid to Ukraine. Ukraine’s President Zelens

SDGs, Targets, and Indicators

1. Which SDGs are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article?

• SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions
• SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals

2. What specific targets under those SDGs can be identified based on the article’s content?

• Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
• Target 16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
• Target 17.16: Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology, and financial resources

3. Are there any indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets?

• Indicator for Target 16.1: Number of conflict-related deaths, including those resulting from terrorism
• Indicator for Target 16.3: Proportion of population who have experienced a dispute in the past two years and who accessed a formal or informal dispute resolution mechanism, by type of mechanism
• Indicator for Target 17.16: Amount of financial resources mobilized from developed countries to developing countries in support of their national plans and programs to implement the Sustainable Development Goals

Table: SDGs, Targets, and Indicators

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Source: cepa.org

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