A More Effective Approach to Countering the Muslim Brotherhood – The Washington Institute

Report on U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood and its Alignment with Sustainable Development Goals

Introduction: Counter-Terrorism and Sustainable Development Goal 16

Recent events, including an antisemitic attack in Boulder, Colorado, by an individual reportedly supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, have intensified calls within the United States for the designation of the entire movement as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This report analyzes the complexities of such a designation and proposes a more targeted strategy that aligns with the principles of Sustainable Development Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. A focused approach, targeting specific entities involved in illicit financing and violence, is more effective in upholding the rule of law and contributing to international peace and security.

Challenges in Universal Designation and the Importance of Strong Institutions (SDG 16)

The Lack of Unitary Leadership

A primary obstacle to a blanket FTO designation is the decentralized nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. Established in Egypt in 1928, the movement has spawned numerous global branches, including Hamas, but lacks a centrally directed, unified leadership structure. This presents significant legal challenges under U.S. counter-terrorism authorities, which require demonstrable evidence of a cohesive organization. Upholding rigorous legal thresholds is fundamental to maintaining strong and accountable institutions, a key target of SDG 16. A broad designation without sufficient evidence could undermine the legal frameworks designed to combat terrorism effectively.

A Proposed Framework for Targeted Sanctions

A more legally sound and productive strategy involves a bifurcated approach that directly supports the objectives of SDG 16:

1. Designate Brotherhood-associated entities that provide material support to designated terrorist groups like Hamas as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). This directly addresses SDG Target 16.4 concerning the reduction of illicit financial flows.
2. Designate individual Brotherhood branches that engage in terrorism as FTOs. This action supports SDG Target 16.1, which aims to reduce all forms of violence.

Disrupting Illicit Financial Flows in Support of SDG 16.4

Targeting Entities Providing Material Support to Hamas

In alignment with SDG Target 16.4, which calls for a significant reduction in illicit financial flows, U.S. policy should prioritize sanctioning Brotherhood-affiliated entities that fund Hamas. This activity has reportedly increased since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. International reports, including a 2015 UK government review, have detailed the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in facilitating funding for Hamas. Evidence collected by Israel from Gaza has further illuminated these financial networks, identifying organizations such as the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA) as functioning representatives for Hamas abroad.

Historical Precedents and Ongoing Networks

The financial and organizational links between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are well-documented. Following Hamas’s formation as the movement’s Palestinian branch, a global network of “Palestine Committees” was established to provide support. This network has been the subject of numerous international legal and administrative actions aimed at curbing illicit financial flows.

• The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF): Designated by the U.S. Treasury in 2001, its leaders were later convicted for providing millions of dollars to Hamas.
• The Union of Good: A global umbrella organization of over 50 charities, led by Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi, was designated by the U.S. for facilitating Hamas’s overseas financial activities. The network remains operational.
• Internationale Humanitaere Hilfsorganisation (IHH): The German wing of this Union of Good member was banned in 2010 for fundraising for Hamas.
• Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe: A 2019 Spanish court case highlighted this Brotherhood-dominated organization’s links to Hamas.
• Recent U.S. Treasury Designations: In June 2025, the Treasury Department designated several “sham charities” tied to the Brotherhood across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe for funding Hamas.

Addressing Direct Violence to Advance SDG 16.1

Designating Violent Branches as Foreign Terrorist Organizations

To directly advance SDG Target 16.1 (the reduction of all forms of violence), the U.S. should designate specific Muslim Brotherhood branches that have engaged in terrorist activities. While many branches avoid overt violence, several have crossed this threshold, making them eligible for FTO designation.

• Jordanian Branch: The movement was banned in Jordan in April following charges against members for planning a terrorist attack.
• Lebanese Branch (al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah): Its militant wing, the al-Fajr Forces, has launched rocket attacks against Israel in coordination with Hezbollah and has worked closely with Hamas in Lebanon.

A Precedent for a Focused Approach

The first Trump administration provided a model for this targeted strategy by designating two violent, Egypt-based splinter groups, Liwa al-Thawra and Harakat Sawad Misr, as FTOs. This focused, evidence-based approach reinforces the rule of law and warns other branches against engaging in violence, thereby contributing to regional stability and the goals of SDG 16.

Conclusion: A Strategic Path Forward for Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions

A sweeping designation of the entire Muslim Brotherhood movement would be counterproductive and legally tenuous. Instead, a targeted approach that focuses on sanctioning entities for specific illicit activities is more effective and aligns with the global commitment to SDG 16. By designating financial facilitators as SDGTs and violent branches as FTOs, the U.S. can effectively combat terrorism by disrupting illicit financial flows (SDG 16.4) and reducing violence (SDG 16.1). To maximize impact, this strategy must be supported by international cooperation, particularly with European partners, as envisioned in SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals. Such a legally sound and strategically focused policy strengthens national and international institutions and contributes to building a more peaceful and stable Middle East.

Analysis of Sustainable Development Goals in the Article

1. Which SDGs are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article?

• SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

  This goal is central to the article, which focuses on combating terrorism, reducing violence, and strengthening legal frameworks to address security threats. The discussion revolves around designating terrorist organizations, disrupting their financial support networks, and using national and international legal tools to promote peace and stability. The article’s core theme is about creating a “more stable, peaceful Middle East” by holding violent groups and their financiers accountable through robust institutional and legal actions.

• SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals

  The article implicitly addresses this goal by highlighting the necessity of international cooperation to effectively counter terrorism. It notes that unilateral U.S. actions have limited impact and emphasizes the need to persuade other governments, “particularly in Europe,” to take similar steps. This underscores the importance of global partnerships to achieve the shared objective of peace and security, which is linked to SDG 16.

2. What specific targets under those SDGs can be identified based on the article’s content?

1. Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.

   The article directly relates to this target by discussing the violent activities of terrorist groups. It mentions Hamas’s “terrorist assault on Israel,” the “deadly bombings, assassinations, and other attacks in Egypt” by Muslim Brotherhood splinter groups, and rocket attacks launched by al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah. The proposed actions, such as designating these groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), are aimed at curbing their capacity to commit violence and thereby reducing related death rates.

2. Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.

   This target is a primary focus of the article. The text extensively details the illicit financial flows that support terrorist organizations. It describes how entities associated with the Muslim Brotherhood provide “funds or other material support to Hamas.” Examples include the Holy Land Foundation providing “millions of dollars,” the “Union of Good” global umbrella organization facilitating Hamas’s overseas financial activities, and various “sham charities” designated for funding Hamas. The recommendation to designate these entities as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) is a direct strategy to combat these illicit financial flows.

3. Target 16.a: Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, to build capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

   The article discusses the strengthening and application of national institutional frameworks to combat terrorism. It refers to U.S. counterterrorism authorities like the FTO and SDGT designation processes, the roles of the Treasury and State Departments, and the U.S. court system. It also highlights international cooperation by mentioning actions taken by the UK, Germany, Jordan, and Israel to ban or designate groups tied to terrorism. The call for a “strong legal framework to go after Brotherhood organizations using both sanctions and law enforcement tools” is a clear call to strengthen these national and international institutions.

4. Target 17.16: Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources…

   The article’s conclusion directly points to this target by stating, “The impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions will only go so far on their own, and other key governments—particularly in Europe—will be far more likely to take similar steps if they are persuaded that the U.S. actions are legally sound and based on concrete, reliable information.” This highlights the need for a partnership approach, where the U.S. shares information and legal justification to mobilize other countries to act in concert against terrorist financing, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the measures.

3. Are there any indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets?

• Indicators for Target 16.1 (Reduce Violence):

  The article implies that progress can be measured by a reduction in the number of violent incidents. An implied indicator would be the number of terrorist attacks, bombings, assassinations, and rocket attacks carried out by the groups mentioned. A decrease in these activities following sanctions would signify progress.

• Indicators for Target 16.4 (Reduce Illicit Financial Flows):

  The article suggests several clear indicators for measuring progress in this area. These include:

  • The number of entities and individuals designated as FTOs or SDGTs for providing financial support to terrorist groups.
  • The volume of illicit financial flows disrupted or seized as a result of these designations. The article mentions “millions of dollars” being transferred, so tracking the interruption of such funds is a key metric.

• Indicators for Target 16.a (Strengthen Institutions):

  Progress towards strengthening institutional capacity can be measured by:

  • The number of countries that have implemented or strengthened legal frameworks (e.g., sanctions, laws, enforcement actions) to combat terrorism and its financing. The article mentions actions by the U.S., UK, Jordan, and Germany as examples.
  • The number of successful prosecutions and convictions related to terrorist financing, such as the 2008 conviction of the Holy Land Foundation leaders mentioned in the text.

• Indicators for Target 17.16 (Global Partnerships):

  The effectiveness of partnerships can be measured by:

  • The number of governments, particularly in Europe, that adopt similar sanctions or legal actions against the entities designated by the U.S. The article explicitly states that persuading other governments to take “similar steps” is a key goal.

4. Summary Table of SDGs, Targets, and Indicators

Source: washingtoninstitute.org