Canada says it is reviewing report on arms flow to Israel despite permit freeze – TRT World

Report on Canadian Military Exports to Israel and Alignment with Sustainable Development Goals

Executive Summary

A recent report alleges that Canadian-manufactured military components continue to reach Israel via United States weapons facilities, despite a Canadian government freeze on new export permits. This situation raises significant questions regarding Canada’s commitment to international peace and its alignment with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production).

Key Findings and Government Response

The report, titled “Exposing the U.S. Loophole: How Canadian F-35 Parts and Explosives Reach Israel,” presents several key allegations concerning Canada’s role in the military supply chain to Israel.

• Hundreds of shipments from Canadian military manufacturers are reportedly being sent to U.S. weapons factories that supply Israel’s military with warplanes, bombs, and artillery shells.
• Canada is identified as a transit corridor for European-made TNT destined for U.S. bomb manufacturers.
• Evidence suggests Canadian-made F-35 components are transferred to Israel shortly after arriving at U.S. facilities.

In response, Global Affairs Canada has issued a statement acknowledging the report and its ongoing review.

1. The department confirmed that no new permits for military items to Israel that could be used in the Gaza conflict have been approved since January 8, 2024.
2. Approximately 30 existing export permits for items destined for Israel were suspended in 2024.
3. All suspended permits remain inactive and cannot be used for export to Israel.

Implications for Sustainable Development Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

The alleged continuation of military component transfers to an active conflict zone directly challenges the principles of SDG 16, which aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions. The “U.S. Loophole” highlights a potential gap in institutional oversight and regulatory enforcement, undermining efforts to reduce illicit arms flows and promote peace. The discrepancy between the stated policy of freezing permits and the continued flow of goods through third-party countries calls into question the effectiveness of national control mechanisms essential for upholding SDG 16.

Analysis of Supply Chain Responsibility and SDG 12

This issue is intrinsically linked to SDG 12, which encourages responsible consumption and production patterns. The report’s findings underscore the critical need for transparency and accountability throughout the entire supply chain, particularly in the defense sector. The alleged use of the U.S. as an intermediary for Canadian military goods circumvents the intended purpose of export controls, failing to ensure that production and distribution practices are managed sustainably and ethically. Achieving SDG 12 requires corporations and governments to adopt practices that prevent products from contributing to conflict and human rights abuses, a standard that is being tested by these revelations.

Broader Humanitarian Context and Related SDGs

The provision of military equipment to conflict zones has severe consequences that impede progress on other fundamental SDGs.

• SDG 1 (No Poverty) & SDG 2 (Zero Hunger): Conflict exacerbates poverty and food insecurity, destroying livelihoods and infrastructure.
• SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being): The use of military hardware in populated areas leads to death, injury, and the collapse of healthcare systems.

By potentially contributing to the continuation of conflict, the export of military components, even indirectly, works against the global agenda to achieve these foundational goals for human development.

Conclusion

The investigation by Global Affairs Canada into the report’s allegations is a critical step. The findings highlight a significant challenge to Canada’s foreign policy and its commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals. Ensuring that national export controls are robust and cannot be circumvented through international supply chains is essential for maintaining institutional integrity (SDG 16), promoting responsible production (SDG 12), and contributing to global peace and security.

Analysis of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Article

1. Which SDGs are addressed or connected to the issues highlighted in the article?

   The primary Sustainable Development Goal connected to the issues in the article is:

   • SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. This goal is central because the article discusses the international transfer of military equipment, government regulation of arms exports, and the implications of these shipments for an active conflict zone. The actions of Global Affairs Canada, the country’s regulatory body for such exports, directly relate to the principles of building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

2. What specific targets under those SDGs can be identified based on the article’s content?

   Based on the article’s focus on arms shipments and government regulation, the following specific targets under SDG 16 can be identified:

   • Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere. The article discusses the shipment of “military equipment,” “F-35 Parts and Explosives,” “warplanes, bombs and artillery shells” to a country involved in a conflict. The provision of such materials is directly linked to the capacity for violence and potential for related deaths in the Gaza conflict mentioned in the text.
   • Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows… The report cited in the article, “Exposing the U.S. Loophole,” highlights a method by which arms and components flow from Canada to Israel despite a freeze on new direct permits. This focus on the regulation, tracking, and potential circumvention of arms transfer controls aligns directly with the goal of reducing arms flows.
   • Target 16.a: Strengthen relevant national institutions… to prevent violence… The article centers on the role and actions of Global Affairs Canada, a national institution responsible for managing export permits for military goods. Its decision to freeze new permits (“Canada has not approved any new permits… since January 8, 2024”) and suspend existing ones (“Canada suspended approximately 30 export permits”) is a direct example of a national institution taking action to regulate arms transfers and prevent their use in violence.

3. Are there any indicators mentioned or implied in the article that can be used to measure progress towards the identified targets?

   Yes, the article mentions and implies several indicators that can be used to measure progress:

   • For Target 16.1: An implied indicator is the volume and type of military equipment being transferred. The article specifies “F-35 components,” “explosives,” “bombs and artillery shells,” which are direct inputs to conflict and violence. Reducing or stopping these shipments would be a measure of progress.
   • For Target 16.4: A direct indicator is the number of controlled shipments and the value of arms transfers. The article refers to “hundreds of shipments from Canadian military manufacturers” and “hundreds of shipments of European-made TNT,” which serve as quantifiable measures of the arms flow being discussed.
   • For Target 16.a: A clear indicator is the existence and enforcement of a national regulatory framework for arms exports. The article provides specific data points for this: the date of the freeze on new permits (January 8, 2024) and the number of existing permits suspended (“approximately 30 export permits”). These actions are measurable indicators of the institution’s efforts to control arms flows.

4. SDGs, Targets and Indicators Table

   SDGs	Targets	Indicators
   SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.	The volume and type of military equipment transferred (e.g., “F-35 components,” “bombs and artillery shells”).
   SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows…	The number of arms shipments (“hundreds of shipments from Canadian military manufacturers”).
   SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	16.a: Strengthen relevant national institutions… to prevent violence…	The number of export permits suspended (“approximately 30 export permits”) and the implementation of freezes on new permits.

Source: trtworld.com